INTRODUCTION
As any professor knows, when confronted with a hard problem, the first tendency of many students is to make assumptions that cause the problem to disappear. Too many modern approaches to climate justice take this approach. They either assume away the climate goal or the justice goal, or they implicitly concede that these goals will not be achieved at all, or will only be achieved with radical technological advances or other heroic developments. In some cases they do so in transparent ways. In other cases, they do so through opaque assumptions in mathematical models. By avoiding the hard truth about the depth of the problem, these approaches delay development of the deep structural changes necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change.
atures, we examine the intuitive plausibility of these approaches. We conclude that although on the surface a number of proposed policy architectures are politically viable, address justice issues, and have reasonably low mitigation costs, upon closer inspection they rest on implausible assumptions and avoid many hard questions.
The most important assumption in proposed policy architectures is that they will achieve an adequate reduction in the risk of catastrophic climate change. Numerous governmental and private entities have articulated a goal of achieving the emissions reductions necessary to limit temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius ("°C") over pre-industrial era levels, 6 a target that will require stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalents ("CO 2 eq") at roughly 450 ppm. 7 Even at 450 ppm CO 2 eq, there is still a substantial risk of higher temperatures, including temperatures that could lead to catastrophic climate change. 8 Thus, even at 450 ppm CO 2 eq the likelihood of catastrophic climate change is far greater than the likelihood that your house will burn down. 9 Unfortunately, many proposed architectures do not purport to achieve atmospheric concentrations in the 450 ppm CO 2 eq range and thus have little prospect of achieving the 2'C target.' 0 Some will achieve temperature increases closer to 3°C, and others will not even do that." The implicit assumption in these proposals is that it is acceptable to miss the widely adopted target. This assumption may be allocation that allows business as usual emissions for developing countries for decades before requiring reductions). 6 See discussion infra notes 56, 92-96, and accompanying text.
Assessments of the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 or CO 2 eq necessary to achieve stabilization at 2'C vary, but the 450 ppm CO 2 eq level is supported by a number of sources. See 192-94 (2008) , available at http://www.garnautreview.org.au/index.htm (follow link for PDF of full report) (discussing various temperature and atmospheric concentration targets). CO 2 is the GHG responsible for more than 80% of anthropogenic radiative forcing, and CO 2 eq is the combination of the six most important greenhouse gases. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF rational based on one's risk tolerance. Climate sensitivity may be less than current models suggest, or the costs of the necessary emissions reductions may be greater than the harms of catastrophic climate change. But unless the likelihood that these architectures will miss the 2°C mark is clear, it will be difficult for policymakers to develop and weigh options that achieve that goal. In addition, even policy architectures that are designed to achieve temperature changes well above 2°C rely on aggressive assumptions about the deployment of new and existing technologies, as well as perfect markets and policy implementation.' 2 The use of aggressive assumptions is fueled by the magnitude of the task. For example, even to achieve a global GHG target of roughly 650 ppm CO 2 eq (a target far above the 450 ppm CO 2 eq target associated with the 2°C goal) by using nuclear power alone would require the addition of a new, standard-sized (1000 megawatt) nuclear power plant every day for the next fifty years, in addition to substantial increases in efficiency and conservation.' 3 To achieve a 650 ppm CO 2 eq target with solar power would require installing twenty-seven square kilometers of solar cells every day over that period.1 4 The assumptions regarding developing country incentives are similarly aggressive. Many policy architectures assume that developing countries can be induced to participate by allowing substantial emissions growth and per capita income growth in those countries.' 5 Essentially, developing countries are encouraged to develop and lock in a fossil fuel-driven industrialized society for decades before strong incentives push them to make the same transition that developed countries must make in the near future. Yet, to achieve an atmospheric GHG target of 450 ppm CO 2 eq, global per capita GHG emissions in 2050 need to be at roughly the current level of India (two metric tons of CO 2 eq), a level that is one-tenth of the United States (over twenty 2 See discussion infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text; see also Stem, supra note 7, at 23.
"3 See Nathan S. Lewis, Professor, Cal. Inst. of Tech., Talk: Chemical Challenges in Renewable Energy 2-8 (transcript available at http://nsl.caltech.edu/files/energy-notes.pdf). Lewis's global energy demand estimate for 2050 of twenty-eight terawatts ("TW") assumes substantial demand-side energy efficiency and conservation efforts. See id. at 5. Lewis notes that "stabiliz[ing] at 550 ppm CO 2 would require =20 TW of carbon-free power." Id. at 7. The nuclear 20 TW calculation is 20,000 plants (up from 400 today), each with 1000 megawatt ("MW") capacity, installed over a period of fifty years. See id. at 7-8. Lewis's estimate of 550 ppm CO 2 is roughly equivalent to 650 ppm CO 2 eq, based on the Category IV stabilization range. See IPCC AR4 WG 11I, supra note 7, at 39 tbl.TS.2.
14 Lewis, supra note 13, at 12. Lewis notes that producing 20 TW of power from solar energy, assuming 10% conversion efficiency, would require covering "0.16% of the earth's surface, or 5x10" m 2 with panels. Id. To achieve this capacity in 50 years would require installing 27,400,000 m 2 of panels per day. Note that producing 3 TW in the United States would require 1.7% of the country's land, and "covering every home rooftop in the entire U.S. would generate only 0.25 TW of power." Id.
" See discussion infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Frankel, supra note 5, at 7.
[Vol. tons) and less than one-half of China (over five tons). , 6 If per capita income growth is to be the vehicle for inducing developing countries to participate in a global agreement, it must occur with little or no per capita emissions growth for many developing countries, and substantial net declines for others.
The justice issue further complicates the task. We began our research with the assumption that a deep tension exists between the climate and justice goals, but our analysis suggests that just achieving the climate goal alone cannot occur without progress toward global justice. At the outset, it is hard to imagine overall improvements in the welfare of the poor in a world undergoing catastrophic climate change. 7 Further, a pure GHG strategy that does not account for justice concerns will not achieve the participation of the major developing countries that are essential to meeting atmospheric GHG targets.'" Finally, a GHG strategy that does not account for the relationship between poverty alleviation and GHG emissions will overlook important emissions reductions, 19 and may even induce lifestyle changes that could increase emissions, further undermining the ability to achieve GHG targets. The framing of the climate justice issue as a matter of global income inequality constrains the set of proposed solutions to an untenable subset. If global justice requires ameliorating global income inequality by raising people out of poverty,' 0 and poverty alleviation is synonymous with improvements in the per capita income of people in poverty, 2 ' and carbon emissions are closely associated with per capita income, then simply increasing per capita income is likely to make it very hard to achieve GHG emission reduction targets.
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, 6 See discussion infra notes 110-I1 and accompanying text. Per capita CO 2 eq emissions are based on data for 2005 from World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) version 6.0 (2009), available at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode= view. ' See Miles R. Allen & David J. Frame, Call off the Quest, 318 SCIENCE 582, 582 (2007) (noting that " [o] nce the world has warmed by 4 [degrees] C, conditions will be so different from anything we can observe today ... that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will stop"); RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 46, 197 (2004) (discussing the challenges posed by abrupt climate change). Although improvements in other aspects of life (e.g., disease reduction, increases in consumer goods) achieved through allocations of resources to areas other than emissions reductions may enhance welfare, truly catastrophic climate change would make these other welfare-enhancing developments difficult to achieve. We suggest that greater attention should be directed toward developing policy architectures and initiatives that can improve the well-being of people in poverty in ways that also reduce carbon emissions. We call the political, social, and economic changes necessary to alleviate poverty while reducing GHG emissions "macro-transformation." We do not know precisely how this macro-transformation can or will take place, and we are not naive about the magnitude of the task, but we argue that the debate should begin now. It should not be delayed until the unrealistic assumptions underlying the current climate change policy architecture proposals become apparent.
We assume that macro-transformation will require architectures that provide incentives for developing countries to transition directly from preindustrial or semi-industrial to post-industrial societies, leap-frogging fossil fuel-based industrialization. Achieving macro-transformation will require substantial modifications to global and national public and private climate change governance schemes, and will require integration of GHG emissions reductions goals into many policies and institutions that are now unaffected by GHG considerations, particularly those focused on development. We also assume that macro-transformation will require policy architectures and initiatives that alleviate poverty by improving well-being, not just by increasing per capita incomes. We believe there is reason for optimism in the robust literature in economics and other fields that suggests that improvements in well-being can be achieved not just through increases in per capita income, but through changes in other aspects of life less closely correlated with GHG emissions, such as maternal and child survival, health, education, and access to safe water. 23 We also believe that recent initiatives focused on households, forests, and agriculture in developed and developing countries identify the types of paths that more widespread transformation may take.
In short, this frank truth is lurking too far beneath the surface of climate justice debates: no plausible collection of conventional initiatives, whether emissions allocations, compliance deadlines, or feasible side payments, is likely to induce the major emitting countries to participate in an international agreement that will achieve the temperature targets necessary to substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. By making assumptions about a more lenient temperature target, technological and other developments, and the ability to address poverty through per capita income increases, too many proposed approaches fail to address the hardest question: are these measures enough? The tendency to avoid this hard question is understandable. Those who worry most about climate may be willing to set unrealistic targets or use other unrealistic assumptions to avoid undermining public support. Those who worry most about the economic costs of mitigation or are skeptical of climate science may be willing to do the same to ensure that mitigation costs are low. Those who worry most about the poor may be willing to do the same to maximize the chance that governments will adopt policies that alleviate poverty.
It is possible that a lenient temperature target combined with optimistic technology, poverty alleviation, and other assumptions will lead to a successful resolution of the global political impasse. Parties may begin to take actions they would not otherwise take, resulting in patterns of behavior that facilitate future international agreements, domestic policies, and private market responses. But there is a tremendous opportunity cost. The time spent designing policy architectures and initiatives that may require future modification could instead be spent designing architectures and initiatives that are more likely to achieve the climate change goal. If we confront the problem head-on, it might be possible to achieve the climate and justice goals through adding new types of short-term measures that buy time on the climate front (e.g., equity micro-offsets) and to foster a longer term re-conceptualization of emissions reduction methods (macro-transformation). When combined with global public governance schemes such as cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes, as well as major technological developments, these political, social, and economic transformations may increase the prospects that developed and developing countries will view steep emissions reductions as in their interest, and may enable aggressive emissions targets to be achieved, not assumed away.
We present our analysis in two Parts. In Part I, we examine the plausibility of achieving a viable climate solution with the current proposed policy architectures. We identify substantial doubts that they will achieve widely accepted temperature targets. In Part II, we identify several core characteristics of more transformative approaches. We also propose equity micro-offsets as one near-term climate change response that will use private markets to harness altruistic and climate norms to generate emissions reductions and increased welfare among the world's poor. Equity micro-offsets are GHG offsets generated by funding actions that reduce emissions from individuals who are at or below the poverty level. We also identify the contours of the macro-transformation that may be necessary by providing examples of existing public and private initiatives that integrate climate and justice goals by design.
I. PROPOSED GLOBAL CLIMATE ARCHITECTURES
Our first point is that achieving climate and justice goals will be very difficult with conventional policy architectures and initiatives. By policy architectures, we mean the high-level allocations of benefits and burdens in any international treaty or other public governance scheme. The hard questions regarding climate justice are difficult to confront in part because numerous variables and inconsistent terminology make it a challenge to analyze policy architectures and to identify important assumptions and implications. 5 We are bound to have made errors in several places. At the same time, we believe that it is possible to assemble a sufficiently complete story to test the plausibility of the proposed policy architectures.
Part L.A discusses our rationale for testing the plausibility of the assumptions underlying conventional policy architectures. Part I.B examines the features of the leading architectures, and Part I.C identifies assumptions that undermine the plausibility of the proposed architectures.
A. An Intuitive Plausibility Test
We examine the plausibility that the proposed policy architectures will substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. In using a plausibility test rather than a quantitative model, we recognize that some degree of rigor will be lost, and precise assessments will not be possible. Nevertheless, we believe that a test for intuitive plausibility can expose weaknesses in the accuracy of assumptions and outcomes that may not be apparent from other methodologies.
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The value of plausibility testing is an important aspect of an exchange taking place among William Nordhaus, Martin Weitzman, and other econo-25 For example, reports vary regarding the GHG type used for the policy target (e.g., CO 2 or CO 2 eq), the emissions source categories included (e.g., industry-only or all sources), the timing and amount of emissions reductions that will achieve particular atmospheric targets, the benchmark year for calculating emissions reductions, the atmospheric targets that will achieve desired temperature targets, whether peak values or values at stabilization should be used, the probabilities and magnitudes of climate harms and costs that may arise from those harms, the impact of various allocations of burdens and benefits on the incentives of developed and developing countries, and the impacts of those allocations on climate and justice goals. See, e.g., Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 5 tbl.l (noting that some policy architectures identify GHG targets and others do not); see also racy. An inexpensive digital watch may tell time to the tenth of a second, yet be off by an hour.
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Our effort here is in a similar vein. The recent economic meltdown suggests that sophisticated models built on prior experience sometimes yield precise but inaccurate answers when they fail to account for low probability, high consequence events. 33 A simple plausibility analysis several years ago might not have yielded precise results, but it might have induced policymakers to take a second look at the financial system while many policy responses were still available. 34 We identify substantial concerns about the plausibility of many conventional climate change policy architectures.
B. The Happy Story: Proposed Climate Change Policy Architectures
The principal challenge confronting climate change policymakers is to allocate the benefits and burdens in ways that will induce a sufficient number of the major emitters to participate and yet achieve the desired atmospheric GHG targets. At first glance, the prospects for such an agreement look good. For example, the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report ("AR4") by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") provides an analysis that suggests that the emissions reduction costs are not daunting.
3 5 Of the five categories of emissions scenarios analyzed in the AR4, Categories III and IV have been the focus of much attention by policymakers and academicians. 6 The Category III scenarios, which stabilize atmospheric concentrations at roughly 550 ppm CO 2 eq, 3 7 would result in a temperature increase of 2.8'C to 3.2°C above pre-industrial levels. 8 redistribution, a cap-and-trade scheme with the addition of a program for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation ("REDD"), a global carbon tax, formation of clubs of countries, a research and development scheme, and others. 45 Most of these approaches appear to reach stabilization at just under 3°C, suggesting that they would achieve CO 2 eq levels roughly estimates that cuts of 30 to 50% by 2050 are necessary to achieve stabilization at 550 ppm CO 2 eq, and suggests that these levels could be achieved with a cost of 1% of world GDP or about $30 per ton of CO 2 by 2030. Stem, supra note 7, at 3. Stabilization at 550 ppm CO 2 eq would require global emissions to peak in the next twenty years. Id. at 7. 31 IPCC AR4 WG ml, supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 227, 229 tbl.3.10.
I Id. at 205-06. The Stern Review GDP loss estimate for roughly the same atmospheric concentration is between -2% and +5%. Id. at 206.
4, Id. at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10. Note that as stated by the IPCC, the figure we identify as roughly 650 ppm CO 2 eq (stated as a range of 590 to 710 ppm CO 2 eq) corresponds roughly with our 550 ppm CO 2 figure (stated as a range from 485 to 570 ppm CO). Stern has expressed disagreement with economists who have argued for stabilization levels at or above 650 ppm CO 2 eq. See Stem, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Nordhaus, supra note 27, at 166, and Mendelsohn, supra note 27, at 95). 42 A number of proposals have focused on providing the incentives necessary to induce the major developing countries to participate in an international agreement. For example, India and Germany have proposed convergence between developed and developing country per capita emissions levels, followed by joint reductions. 47 This approach would enable the developed and developing countries to meet in the middle of the current per capita emissions ranges to allow emissions growth and economic growth by developing countries. After the developing countries have gained the economic benefits associated with emissions growth and the developed countries have demonstrated good faith and incurred the costs of reducing emissions toward the convergence point, both the developed and developing countries would reduce emissions to comparable levels. 4 1 Other proposals use limited or delayed GHG reduction targets to create incentives for developing countries to participate.
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In addition, a number of proposed policy architectures explicitly address poverty alleviation. 0 For example, the Greenhouse Development Rights ("GDR") concept developed by EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute would allocate emissions reductions based on national responsibility for and capacity to reduce emissions, and it would exclude emissions associated with individuals whose annual income and consumption are below $7500 from any country's capacity and responsibility for emissions reductions." s A benefit of the GDR approach is that it acknowledges that there are poor and wealthy individuals in developing and developed countries, and it enables a nation-state level allocation to be made that accounts for these populations. 2 Other proposals exclude emissions from individuals at other levels, such as $9000 per capita income. s3 The effect of these approaches is to generate emissions allocations that allow for and induce per capita income growth among the poor. In sum, the implications of the IPCC AR4 and a wide range of proposed policy architectures are that an international climate agreement can be secured that will achieve climate-goals, will be affordable using conventional approaches, and will result in poverty alleviation. This is the happy story.
C. The Other Story: The Plausibility of Proposed Policy Architectures
The other story is more troubling. A number of extremely optimistic assumptions undermine the plausibility of the proposed policy architectures. Our analysis raises serious doubts about whether any conventional policy architecture will achieve a viable agreement that substantially reduces the risk of catastrophic climate change. 4
Atmospheric and Temperature Targets
The first concern is that the dominant policy architectures seek to achieve atmospheric concentrations and temperatures that do not meet the widely adopted 2'C temperature target, and the higher temperature targets of the proposed architectures will leave surprisingly high likelihoods of catastrophic climate harms. Policymakers first converged on 2°C almost two decades ago as the upper bound of the temperature increase as compared to pre-industrial levels that can occur without an unacceptable increase in the risk of catastrophic climate change.
5 Presumably to achieve a target temperature increase of roughly 2°C, public international organizations in the 51 Some modeling results demonstrate the difficulty of relying only on conventional approaches. For example, one model suggests that even with a target of 550 CO 2 eq, the largest emitting nations must substantially reduce emissions by 2050, including 80% reductions by the United States and slower emission growth rates by China. Even in this scenario, the planet is likely to be 4 to 6°C warmer. See Richard Harris, Innovation Seen as Key to Curbing Climate Change, NPR, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1002294 50 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). To achieve a lower atmospheric concentration such as 400 ppm CO 2 eq, one scenario would require that the eight largest industrialized nations and the biggest rapidly industrializing nations, including China and India, each reduce emissions by 5% per year, and would require stable emissions from the rest of the world. The costs would be in the tens of trillions of dollars. Id.
11 In 1990, the WMO/ICSU/UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases ("AGGG") concluded that 2°C was "an upper limit beyond which the risks of grave damage to ecosystems, and of non-linear responses, are expected to increase rapidly. Despite the widespread adoption of the 2°C goal, it is difficult to identify a proposed policy architecture that seeks to achieve 2°C or less. 61 For example, the eight policy architectures evaluated by Bosetti et al. generate temperature increases in the 2.5 to 3°C range, which is roughly consistent 5 For example, after adopting the 2°C target in 2007, the European Parliament adopted the "Florenz report," which calls for the European Union to reduce GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 6 One NGO advocates a 350 ppm CO 2 standard, which would translate to roughly 400 to 450 ppm CO 2 eq, but the group has not proposed a policy architecture for achieving this target. See Understanding 350, http://www.350.org/understanding-350 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (identifying a strategy of political activism to encourage international consensus that would "put a high enough price on carbon that we stop using so much" and to effectively reduce "carbon 80% by 2050," and mentioning that this would entail a switch to non-coal energy, better land-use, and waste reduction); see also IPCC AR4 WG Ill, supra note 7, at 229 tbl.3.10 (noting that 350 ppm CO 2 is consistent with 445 ppm CO 2 eq).
with the temperature increases associated with AR4 Category 11.62 If emissions are reduced to the Category I level, stabilization will occur at atmospheric concentrations of roughly 550 ppm CO 2 eq and with a temperature increase of 2.8 to 3.2'C. 63 If emissions are reduced to the AR4 Category IV level, stabilization will occur at atmospheric concentrations of roughly 650 ppm CO 2 eq and a temperature increase of 3.2 to 4°C over pre-industrial levels. 64 None of the architectures evaluated by Bosetti et al. will limit likely temperature increases to 2°C or less, and all would allow increases approaching 3°C or more. 65 The bad news is that even if we assume that these temperature targets will enable emissions allocations that achieve a viable international agreement (a point we return to in the next Section), the targets will leave a substantial possibility of catastrophic climate change. 66 Only AR4 Category I, the most aggressive of the four AR4 categories, has the prospect of achieving the 2°C target, and even then it will do so only if the actual temperature increases are at the lowest end of the projected temperature range 67 : AR4
Category I stabilizes atmospheric concentrations at roughly 450 ppm CO 2 eq, 6 s which would result in a temperature increase of roughly 2.0 to 2.4°C.69
a. Climate Economics: Tail Risks
Now the truly bad news. Recent developments suggest that the risk of catastrophic climate change is even greater than when policymakers set the targets at 2°C and when the risks were identified in the AR4. 70 As discussed above, economists and climate scientists have become increasingly focused on the risks that remain even at atmospheric concentrations of 450 to 550 ppm CO 2 eq. Perhaps the most accessible presentation of these thick tail I The 2007 IPCC AR4 suggests that an atmospheric concentration range of 500 to 550 ppm CO 2 eq, at the low end of the Category III levels, will leave an 80% risk that wanning will exceed 3°C. The risk will be much higher at Category IV levels. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 227 tbl.3.9; Hare, supra note 62, at 13-22, 23 (noting that stabilizing at 475 ppm CO 2 eq still generates a 50% risk that warming will exceed 2°C).
67 Hare, supra note 62, at 25 (noting that achieving 2°C peak temperature would require 400 ppm CO 2 eq levels).
6' The IPCC AR4 refers to concentrations of between 350 and 400 ppm CO 2 , and CO 2 eq at 445 to 490 ppm. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl.3.5, 229 tbl.3.10. 69 Id.; see also Hare, supra note 62, at 28 (noting that it is unlikely that this scenario will stabilize temperatures at 2'C or less).
70 Hare, supra note 62, at 19 (noting that "[a] warming of 2 degrees Celsius is clearly not 'safe' and would not prevent, with high certainty, dangerous interference with the climate system"). If the analysis presented in Table I is correct, even at 450 ppm CO 2 eq (roughly the AR4 Category I level, which is substantially lower than the targets of many proposed policy architectures) there is a substantial likelihood of temperature increases in the 3 to 5OC range. At CO 2 eq atmospheric concentrations of 550 ppm (roughly the AR4 Category III level, and a common target for proposed policy architectures) there is a substantial likelihood of temperature increases of 5°C or more. 72 At temperatures in this range, the ice and snow cover around the world may disappear, and sea level rises of ten meters or more could occur. In addition, economist Martin Weitzman reads the six emissions scenarios in the IPCC AR4 to imply a mean temperature increase of 2.8°C, with about a 2% chance of a greater than 6'C temperature increase. 7 4 He asserts that 2% is a far higher probability than the risks tolerated in many other areas and that at 6 0 C or higher, conditions will be "in the terra incognita of what any honest economic modeler would have to admit is a planet Earth reconfigured as science fiction."
75 Although Weitzman and others are debating the appropriate treatment of thick tail risks, and it is too soon to know how the debate will be resolved, the debate should at a minimum give us pause about whether the atmospheric target assumptions embedded in the 7' Stem, supra note 7, at 5 tbl.l (citing work of the Hadley Center as published in the Stem Review). 71 Id. at 6. The Garnaut Climate Change Review concluded that temperature increases above 5. VC would "result in a severe" reduction in human welfare. "Their impacts on human civilisation and most ecosystems are likely to be catastrophic." GARNAUT, supra note 7, at 263. First, new research suggests that a substantial amount of temperature increase, changes in weather patterns, and sea level rise will occur and will be "largely irreversible" even based on existing atmospheric GHG levels. 77 Second, carbon emissions are growing at a faster rate than projected by the IPCC, although the growth will be reduced in the near-term by the economic crisis. 7 8 Third, Arctic sea ice is melting faster than projected by the IPCC. Sea ice reflects most of the sun's energy, but open ocean serves as a giant sponge, absorbing most of that energy and contributing to additional icemelting and warming, and additional releases of carbon dioxide and methane. 80 Recent scientific studies suggest that even at 2°C the Arctic summer ice, and eventually the Greenland ice sheet, may be lost, and that the widelyreported AR4 projection of a 0.18 to 0.59 meter sea level rise by 2100 is too conservative.
8 ' Finally, Antarctica is warming and has been losing glacial mass at an increasing rate. 82 The recent scientific developments have in- duced a number of scholars to call for atmospheric targets of 450 ppm CO 2 eq or below and temperature targets of 2'C or below. 3 As with the thick tail debate, these developments raise questions about the atmospheric target assumptions embedded in the proposed policy architectures.
Technological and Market Assumptions
Even if we assume that 550 ppm CO 2 eq (or roughly a 3°C temperature increase) is an adequate goal, the costs and viability of achieving this goal with conventional measures are daunting. For example, even if AR4 Category II or IV levels of emissions reductions are acceptable, the cost estimates of achieving those reductions rely on very favorable assumptions. The models tend to assume no transaction costs, transparent markets, and perfect implementation of policy measures until 2100. 4 According to the AR4, "[r]elaxation of these modeling assumptions... will lead to an appreciable increase in all cost categories." 85 The models evaluated by the IPCC not only assume no transaction or adoption costs and perfect markets, but also rapid development and deployment of new technologies, including carbon capture and storage ("CCS").8
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According to Stem, given the difficulty of reducing agricultural emissions, and the likelihood that richer nations will need to make greater cuts than poorer ones, the richer nations may need to achieve near-zero carbon emissions from the transportation and power sectors, which would require "radical" technological changes and "an end to deforestation. Assuming a substantial amount of technological development is plausible and is a common strategy. For example, the Pacala and Socolow stabilization wedge strategy suggests that emissions can be leveled off in the near term with vigorous deployment and development of currently available technologies, and they suggest that their wedges will buy time for the development of new technologies that can begin steep reductions by 2050. 90 The new technologies must provide energy to both buildings and transport with near-zero carbon emissions, however, and must do so at prices and with other characteristics that induce prompt and widespread uptake in developed and developing countries. Pacala and Socolow describe the necessary new technologies as "revolutionary." 91 Stem has suggested that even just to achieve 50% global reductions by 2050, "richer countries will need to have close to zero emissions in power (electricity) and transport .... "92 "IR]adical changes to the source and use of energy, including much greater energy efficiency," would be required to achieve these reductions. 93 Even the Stem Report, which was criticized for being too aggressive in its recommendations for emissions reductions and too optimistic about the costs of mitigation, rejected modeling the costs of achieving concentrations below 450 ppm CO 2 eq, not because these reductions were unnecessary to achieve the 2°C target, but because they were viewed to be "excessively difficult and costly. ' 9 4 According to the IPCC, the assumptions necessary to achieve AR4 Category I atmospheric concentrations and temperature levels, which are likely to result in temperature increases close to 2°C, are extreme. Most scenarios that achieve Category I levels begin emissions reductions before 201591 and reduce total global emissions by 50 to 85% from 2000 levels by 2050.96 The IPCC AR4 analysis suggests that to achieve 450 ppm CO 2 eq levels, industrialized countries would need to make 25 to 40% cuts in GHGs below 1990 levels by 2020, and 80 to 95% cuts by 2050. 97 Latin America, East Asia (including China), and the Middle East would need to make substantial reductions in emissions growth by 2020. South Asia (including India) and of the scenarios with drastic C02 reductions for the USA and the UK assume the introduction of CCS." Id. at 217. In addition, a target of 400 ppm CO 2 eq will provide more comfort that the 2°C threshold will not be exceeded, but according to one estimate it will require near-zero worldwide carbon emissions between 2050 and 2100, and negative emissions (removal of GHGs from the atmosphere) in the last quarter of the century (e.g., through biomass energy capture and storage). 99 Other recent scenarios that achieve 400 ppm CO 2 eq'0° require 60 to 70% CO 2 reductions from 1990 levels by 2050, and 40 to 60% total global GHG cuts by 2050. All have negative CO 2 emissions in the second half of the century. 10 We do not know what achieving stabilization at or below 2°C would cost. Few cost estimates of Category I emissions reductions have been prepared, and the cost estimates that have been prepared tend to assume low baseline emissions levels that appear unrealistic given the recent global emissions growth. 02 We do know that, according to the IPCC, "[t]he attainability of such low [Category 1] targets is shown to depend on: 1) using a wide range of different reduction options; and 2) the technology 'readiness' of advanced technologies, in particular the combination of bio-energy, carbon capture and geologic storage (BECCS)."' 1 03 The IPCC also states that "[a]chieving these low-emission trajectories requires a comprehensive global mitigation effort, including a further tightening of existing climate policies in Annex I countries, and simultaneous emission mitigation in developing countries, where most of the increase in emissions is expected in the coming decades." ' l 4 Not surprisingly, Bosetti et al. conclude that "more drastic measures" than the current proposed policy architectures would be required to meet the 2°C goal. 05 Of course, one or more near-miraculous technological developments could achieve atmospheric concentrations at 450 ppm CO 2 eq or below and increase the likelihood that temperature increases will not exceed 2 0 C. But these technologies would need to provide energy for transport and buildings with almost no net carbon emissions. Perhaps it is not surprising that schol-98 Id. at 29. 99 Id. at 23-25.
'o Id. at 26. Hare describes 450 ppm CO 2 eq as "far higher" than the atmospheric stabilization concentrations necessary to achieve a high likelihood of limiting warming to 2°C or less. Id. at 28.
10l Id. at 26. " o By making optimistic assumptions about baselines, some cost estimates project GDP losses by 2030 of only 3% or less, with a 2050 GDP loss that is generally less than 5.5%. IPCC AR4 WG 1I, supra note 7, at 205-06. The Stem Review cost estimate for roughly the same atmospheric concentration was for a GDP loss of between -2% and +5%. Id. at 206. Too few assessments have been done of Category I costs in 2100 for analysis by the IPCC in AR4. Id. at 205-06. ars use terms like "drastic,"' 6 "revolutionary," ' °7 and "radical"' 0 8 to describe the technological developments necessary to achieve emissions reduction levels that are likely to achieve the 2°C goal. In our view, although the development and deployment of such technologies is not impossible, it is not prudent to develop a policy that will fail if the technological change does not occur as rapidly as assumed.
Incentive Creation Through Emissions Allocations and Deadlines
To be plausible, any proposed policy architecture must identify allocations of benefits and burdens that will achieve a viable international agreement. One means of inducing developing countries to sign on to an agreement is to provide them with incentives through excess emissions allowances, extended compliance deadlines, or side payments in the form of cash, technology transfers, or other means. Yet given the global emissions reductions that are necessary even to achieve a 3°C temperature target, the ability to provide incentives in the form of excess allowances and extended compliance deadlines is limited."°9 A brief review of per-capita and percountry emissions suggests that the proposed policy architectures include very optimistic assumptions about the incentives of the major emitting countries.
a. Per Capita Analysis
A first test of the plausibility of current proposals to address poverty and catastrophic climate change is a per capita analysis. To achieve roughly 550 ppm CO 2 eq (which would still result in temperatures that are more likely to result in a temperature increase of roughly 3°C than 2C), if in 2050 the world's population is 9 billion (as expected), global annual per capita emissions would need to be reduced by 50%, to roughly two tons of CO 2 eq per person." 0 The reductions necessary to get to a two ton per capita level are all the more daunting because they must take place against a baseline of doubling under business as usual assumptions."' The two ton per capita level would require massive reductions in developed countries, which now have far higher per capita emissions. For example, the United States is at roughly twenty tons of CO 2 eq per capita today, suggesting that a 90% reduction in per capita emissions would be necessary by 2050 if the target is two tons per capita. Japan and Europe are in the ten ton range now, suggesting the need for an 80% reduction. 11 2 As we note above, emissions reductions of these levels would require near-zero emissions from buildings and transportation unless substantial reductions are achieved from other sectors." 3 The two ton per capita limit also casts doubt on the political viability of proposed architectures that would enable economic growth via substantial per capita emissions growth in developing countries. To get a sense of the challenge of achieving the two ton level, per capita emissions will need to be one-half to one-third of current Chinese emissions, and about equal to current Indian emissions." 4 China alone has accounted for two-thirds of the growth in world carbon emissions since 2000 and is expected to grow substantially on an aggregate and per capita basis." 5 China is now the largest GHG-emitting nation, and it recently reiterated its position that economic growth is a higher priority than GHG emissions reductions. The prospects that China, with roughly 36% of its population living on less than two dollars per day (a figure close to the World Bank poverty line)," 7 will commit to and comply with an agreement obligating it to reduce GHG emissions by half by 2050 are vanishingly small at this point.", 8 Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that India will commit to no growth in per capita GHG emissions by 2050, particularly given that roughly 76% of its population is living on two dollars or less per day." 9 We discuss the poverty issue in more detail below, but even in the absence of poverty issues, the prospects for inducing China, India, and other developing countries to perceive these targets as in their interest are limited.
b. Major Emitting Countries
A second approach to evaluating the plausibility of proposed architectures is to simplify the analysis by focusing on the largest emitting countries to understand the extent of the emissions reductions necessary from the major players. 120 We refer to China as a developing country in this Article, although we recognize that China and several other developing countries are rapidly industrializing. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing China as a part of the "developing world"); Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that China, India, and Brazil are "developing countries that are, or will soon be, industrial powers"). The totals exclude emissions from land use and forestry, for which only data from 2000 are available and the reliability of the data is unclear. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") has cautioned that "[p]arties reported difficulties in obtaining activity data for the time series needed for the LUCF sector, as requested by the IPCC methodology. National data on land use and forest cover were often outdated or not in a suitable format. The five largest emitters among the developing countries (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia) account for almost 30% of the GHG emissions from all countries. These five developing countries also have projected emissions growth rates that are among the steepest of all major emitters. For example, the International Energy Agency ("lEA") predicts that the energy-related emissions in the business as usual case will be 225% larger for China in 2030, 190% for India, 177% for Brazil, 172% for Mexico, and 190% for Indonesia.' 22 In fact, 97% of the increase in global energy-related CO 2 emissions is expected to arise from countries that are not among the industrialized countries that comprise the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").'
23 To achieve a global 50% emissions reduction when five of the top fifteen countries have steep growth rates will require extraordinary reductions from business as usual levels.
c. Major Emitting Sectors
A third test of intuitive plausibility focuses on the categories of source types, rather than national per capita or aggregate emissions. The problem with the scope of the needed reductions from developing countries is confounded by the fact that the emissions categories above exclude GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land use changes, which make up a large share of the emissions from these five countries. Data presented in Figure 1 on Much of the focus of emissions reduction strategies to date has been on industry, energy supply, and transport, which comprise roughly two-thirds of all 2004 CO 2 eq emissions. According to the IPCC data presented in Figure  1 , however, agriculture and forestry emissions contributed roughly 30% of global emissions in 2004.125 These emissions arise from agricultural practices and deforestation in developed and developing countries. Deforestation is a particular concern in Brazil, Indonesia, and several other developing countries. Forestry and agricultural emissions are influenced not only by practices in developing countries but also by consumption patterns in developed countries.
12 6 Individual and household emissions are distributed among the energy supply, buildings, and transport sectors on Figure 1, Even putting aside the black carbon emissions from the household sector, achieving global GHG reductions of 50% or more will be very difficult if agriculture, forestry, and other land uses are not included in the remedial measures. Given that agriculture and forestry comprise over 30% of the total, achieving emissions reductions in the 80% or greater range may be impossible without reductions from these sectors.' 28 At the same time, emissions associated with these sectors are often omitted from climate policy architectures.' 29
Poverty Alleviation
A fourth test of the plausibility of proposed policy architectures is to examine the means by which they address poverty alleviation. As discussed above, the five largest GHG-emitting developing countries are critical to the success of any climate policy architecture. All have large populations in poverty. According to World Bank data, the percentage of individuals living on less than two dollars a day are 36% in China, 76% in India, 18% in Brazil, 54% in Indonesia, and 5% in Mexico. 30 It is unlikely that these countries will agree to carbon emissions that make poverty worse, and inducing their participation in a climate change agreement may require a reasonable prospect that some measure of poverty alleviation will occur. In short, there will be no solution to climate change without these major developing nations, and little chance of participation by them without the prospect for substantial poverty alleviation. ' A common approach is convergence: the rich countries contribute to the economic development of the poor countries to enable the two groups to converge on some intermediate level of capita emissions. But if the two ton per capita emissions level is to be achieved by 2050, the convergence must occur quickly. It also must be followed by prompt joint reductions at remarkable levels. A second approach is to assume that emissions reductions should not prevent increases in per capita income up to some minimum level. An example is the GDR approach developed by EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, which excludes populations in any country below $7500 in per capita income from calculations of responsibility and capacity for emissions reductions. Excluding these populations, however, may miss opportunities for initiatives that reduce emissions and enhance the well-being of people in poverty. For example, switching to improved cook stoves will reduce black soot emissions and ill-health effects. Similarly, enabling increases in income to the $7500 level without attending to GHG emissions effects may lead to substantial new GHG emissions from increased production and consumption of consumer goods.
Is it possible to alleviate poverty by increasing per capita income without exceeding climate targets? We examined recent trends in China and India to provide an initial insight into changes in energy-using behavior as incomes increase. In particular, we reviewed recent appliance adoption and usage rates in developing countries for individuals with increased incomes to create a mix of items that many households in developing countries have acquired given the economic wherewithal and access to electricity (see Table  3 ). In China, these included lights, TVs, washers, fans, DVD players, and refrigerators.1 3 2 Indian households have readily adopted lights and fans, then opted for TVs, refrigerators, and water heaters.' 33 Studies suggest that even a small increase in household income can have a significant impact: an urban Indian household whose monthly spending power increases from 300 rupees ($6 USD) to 600 rupees ($12 USD) goes from a 50% likelihood to a 100% likelihood of owning a fan, and from a 25% to a 50% likelihood of owning a TV; at 1700 rupees ($33 USD) per month, half of these households also have a refrigerator.1 34 We do not claim that increases in per capita in- come in the future will generate the same pattern of consumer behavior as has occurred recently in China and India, or that individuals in China and India have a lesser right to a television or refrigerator than people in developed countries. Rather, we point out that if income growth has the effect it has had recently in China and India, substantial increases in GHG emissions will occur, and these increases need to be accounted for in policy architectures. The World Bank estimates that 2.6 billion people are living on less than $2 per day, 136 which we estimate to constitute roughly 530 million households. 137 If each of these households were to adopt the items in the sample basket of appliances identified in The total of 530 million households is based on population figures in WORLD BANK, supra note 117. A regionally-weighted average family size of 4.84 was calculated using statistics for China, India, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, which represent the majority of populations living on less than $2 per day. The totals on a per-country basis include China, estimated median household size of 3. 550 terawatt hours of energy demand, and 814 MMtCO 2 of expected carbon emissions. 3 This is not a normative statement about whether such consumption is unjust by some global measure; by comparison, electricity consumption in U.S. residences totaled 904 MMtCO 2 in 2007. 139 The implication is that we cannot ignore the need to focus on how those in developing countries can achieve commensurate levels of well-being through activities that generate substantially less GHG emissions. The total new emissions from the sample basket of appliances represent 4% of the allowable global emissions in 2050 if we assume that global emissions must be reduced by 50% from year 2000 levels. 14° As an independent country, this would be the eighth largest polluter, ahead of Canada.1 4 1 Thus, if per capita income generates comparable increases in purchases of consumer goods to those that have occurred in China and India in recent years, in the absence of major technological advances, the result will be a major new source of GHG emissions.
Summary
To summarize the argument thus far, the conventional approaches to climate change and poverty make one or more of the following assumptions: (1) emissions reductions can be set at levels that will generate a high likelihood that the 2°C temperature target will not be met; (2) revolutionary technologies can be developed and deployed that will dramatically reduce emissions; (3) governance measures can direct limited attention to the agriculture, forestry, land use, and individual and household sectors; (4) developing countries can be induced to participate through emissions targets that are lenient and that do not require reductions from business as usual for many decades; and (5) poverty concerns can be addressed through incentives that will increase per capita income. To protect against the substantial chance that one or more of these assumptions turns out to be unfounded, we suggest that the conservative approach is to use near-term reductions to buy time not only for technological change, but also for the development of more transformative policy architectures and initiatives.
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'38 Emissions intensity of 1.48 metric tons of CO 2 per MW based on an average of future energy intensity in China (1.45 metric tons of CO 2 per MW) and India (1.51 metric tons of CO 2 per MW) using data from Carbon Monitoring for Action ("CARMA"), http://carma.org/ dig (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). CARMA data were converted at a rate of 0.907 metric tons per short ton. 
II. A DIERENT PATH
Many questions arise if the policy architecture must address climate change and social justice without the aggressive assumptions that are explicit or implicit in current proposed architectures. We do not have answers to these questions, but we offer proposed core characteristics to set the landscape for the debate. We also identify examples of policy initiatives that demonstrate the direction that a more transformative approach may take. Governments may decide that the fundamental changes necessary to achieve the 2°C temperature target are not worth the cost, or they may be unwilling or unable to develop a policy architecture that is politically acceptable, but these decisions should be based on informed politics.
A. Core Characteristics
We begin by proposing a number of core characteristics of macro-transformation and then turn to examples of the types of initiatives that new policy architectures should seek to promote. These characteristics are not meant to displace the widely adopted notions that the climate policy architecture should be just, "scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic.' ' 42 Priority and Urgency. At the outset, scholars and policymakers should give development of transformative policy architectures the priority and urgency suggested by the analysis in Part I. The development of these policy architectures will take years and will involve difficult local, national, and global discussions. In addition, lock-in effects will occur in the meantime. Every new World Bank-subsidized coal-fired power plant, even if it is more efficient than other coal-fired plants, locks in many decades of GHG emissions, reduces incentives to sign on to a post-Kyoto treaty, induces greater demand for electricity, and, by providing cheap but dirty energy, undermines incentives for development and deployment of alternative sources of energy and less energy-intensive development paths. 43 The longer we wait, the more these lock-in effects will occur.' 44 Corporation ("IFC") funding of the Ultra Mega plant, and noting that it will be more efficient than many coal-fired power plants in India); Dot Earth, Money for India's "Ultra Mega" Coal Plants Approved, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/money-for-indias-ultra-megacoal-plants-approved/ (Apr. 9, 2008) (noting that the Ultra Mega plant will emit 23 million tons of CO 2 per year, but that "[tihe I.F.C., along with the Asian Development Bank, Korea, and other backers, sees the need to bring electricity to one of the world's poorest regions as more pressing than limiting carbon dioxide from fuel burning").
I" In addition, if developing countries achieve poverty alleviation using the fossil-fuel intensive path taken by developed countries, when they turn to calculate the costs and benefits of making emissions reductions several decades down the road, the costs will be much higher than if the lock-in effects were minimized along the way. Transfonnation. Despite the magnitude of the challenge, scholars and policymakers should not shy away from proposing transformative architectures and initiatives. Successful new approaches are unlikely to emerge from any one discipline; rather, they will require active collaboration among economists, other social scientists, emissions experts, and law and policy experts. Part of the answer must be in how the question is framed in the developing world. If it is "Do we have the same right to fossil-fuel based industrialization and household consumption that developing countries had?," it is hard to argue that the answer is no.'
45 Public subsidies for coalfired power plants and for inexpensive, efficient, but numerous new motor vehicles reflect this approach. 46 Yet the approach has the effect of abandoning of the 2°C goal. If the question is framed as "Do you want to make the same jump to a post-industrial society that the developed countries are making, and skip the intermediate stage that the developed countries are trying to move away from?," it is likewise harder to argue that the answer is no.
The problem, of course, is that no one knows whether poverty alleviation and the GHG emissions reductions necessary to attain the 2'C temperature target can be achieved by a leapfrog approach in developing countries. Can poverty and carbon emissions goals be achieved through combining large, industrial-scale innovations with small-scale, but widespread, approaches? Can a focus on developing and deploying new and existing technologies reduce the need for major new coal-fired electric power plants? How can incentives be created for funding small-scale, but widespread, supply and demand solutions, not just conventional, large-scale, energy supply projects? Can better land use, transportation planning, and technological developments substitute for hundreds of millions of new gas-powered cars in India? We do not claim to know. We only claim that many current policy architectures, which appear to assume that developing countries must pass through the traditional industrialization and consumption stage, have a troubling likelihood of allowing catastrophic climate change to occur and of leaving developing countries perpetually behind developed countries. We argue that more attention should be directed toward developing policy architectures and initiatives that will make the shift from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial economy possible without a fossil fuel-driven interim stage.
Existing Policy Architectures and Initiatives. Climate policy architectures and initiatives should supplement, not replace, existing public governance measures. Existing and proposed international and regional public governance schemes (e.g., cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes), will continue to be an essential component of any global GHG emissions strategy. These measures will raise the price of GHG emissions, which will have 145 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1602. important effects in the developed and developing worlds. Although more transformative steps are needed, the transformative steps will not be a substitute for the conventional approaches, and the need for transformative approaches should not be used to delay or dilute the conventional ones. At the same time, international, regional, and national cap-and-trade, carbon tax, and other schemes should not undermine efforts to generate deeper change. In particular, it is important to recognize that any macro-transformation attempt by a smaller economy could be undermined by actions in large economies. 1 47 Expanded Portfolio of Architectures and Initiatives. The more transformative approach will require a level of law and policy innovation comparable to the one that occurred two decades ago, launching the current focus on cap-and-trade and carbon tax solutions. 148 It may be that a single concept comparable to increasing the price of carbon will emerge to meet this need. It is also possible that a basket of approaches will be necessary, and that the only unifying concept will be that emissions that are largely beyond the reach of carbon prices will be reduced by many of these new approaches. The GHG emissions problem resembles the sulfur dioxide-driven acid rain problem in many ways, but GHG emissions are far more deeply entwined with the full range of consumption and production, and many of these activities are less sensitive to price signals than are sulfur dioxide emissions. Scholars and policymakers certainly will not be starting from scratch. Evaluation of ongoing efforts within carbon finance markets, especially those that also include non-carbon social benefits, such as those targeted at "reducing emissions through deforestation and degradation" ("REDD") or "payment for eco-system services" ("PES"), have taught us a great deal about how both micro-innovations and macro-transformational initiatives can succeed and how they can go wrong.
149
Transformative policy architectures also should reflect the need to provide incentives in the developed and developing worlds for changes in consumption patterns. 1 50 Pricing carbon through a cap-and-trade scheme or a 147 For example, according to the World Bank, if measures of poverty took into account the increase in food prices, global estimates in 2009 "might show a reversal of the steady decline in poverty rates of the previous few years." For many, the fall below poverty can be traced to changes in global food prices due to biofuel policies in the United States and Europe. carbon tax will push incentives in this direction, but price alone may not affect many types of consumption that are carbon-relevant, such as when an activity does not involve the transfer of money, when information about how to save money is unavailable, or when the infrastructure for low-cost, lowemission behaviors does not exist."' Pricing strategies may run into particular limitations in the agriculture, forestry, land use, and individual and household sectors in both developing and developed countries. In addition, cap-and-trade schemes should be carefully designed to reduce incentives for leakage from developed to developing countries as developed world consumption is satisfied by developing world production. ' Studies have demonstrated significant shifts in the most carbon-intensive production to developing countries in recent years, and a recent study concluded that roughly one-third of China's GHG emissions arise from the production of goods for export.
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Expanded Portfolio of Sectors and GHGs. The Part I analysis suggests that the types of sectors that are likely to be only modestly affected by traditional price-based measures (e.g., agriculture, forestry, other land use, and individuals and households) make up a large share of the total GHG emissions inventory, particularly in developing countries. It may be impossible to achieve the necessary reductions by 2050 without these sectors, and even if it is possible to achieve those reductions, it may be more expensive to treat them as less important than the traditional industrial and transportation sources. In both developed and developing countries, price-based laws and policies targeted at large industrial sources and transportation fuels should be supplemented with approaches that address the non-traditional sectors. In addition, all six of the GHGs identified in the Kyoto Protocol should be included in the emissions reduction strategies, and other substances added as necessary. Many types of GHG emissions other than CO 2 are common from the sectors that play a strong role in the developing countries. Examples include emissions from agriculture (e.g., methane and nitrous oxide) and household cooking and heating (e.g., black carbon).
Poverty Alleviation. The analysis in Part I suggests that poverty alleviation is essential to catastrophic climate change risk reduction. Successful transformative policy architectures will strive to achieve both of these goals. Wherever possible, poverty alleviation should be achieved through approaches that reduce GHG emissions, or at worst hold GHG emissions con-(2008) (discussing the importance of examining the relationship between consumption and GHG emissions).
' ' stant. Approaches that attempt to alleviate poverty through transfers (or side payments) rather than structural transformation should be used sparingly, and only after approaches that consider the relationships among povertyrelated and climate-related behaviors. Both small-scale innovations and macro-transformations have the potential to affect the structures that perpetuate poverty or to focus merely on redistribution.
Measures of Well-Being. A transformative approach should measure poverty alleviation not only with traditional per capita income measures, but also with measures that account for improvements in well-being. The growing literature on happiness and well-being suggests that income has limitations as a proxy for well-being, and that the use of income as a metric may lead to policies that generate higher levels of GHG emissions than would occur if broader measures were used. Although increases in income are associated with increases in happiness or well-being at low income levels, the relationship weakens as income increases, and even for low-income individuals, income is an incomplete measure of well-being.'
14
The factors associated with increased well-being that are not captured by changes in per capita income may be particularly important for joint efforts to alleviate poverty and reduce GHG emissions in developing countries. In developing countries, a larger proportion of consumption and labor takes place without monetary transfers, making the impact of income on well-being difficult to measure. For example, when incomes rise through paid employment, domestic labor burdens shift to those not in the formal work place. 55 This production includes care work, but also home-based production such as agriculture and rice processing. With such shifts, children (girls more so than boys) are drawn out of school. The net impact on the well-being of each family member cannot be measured by the increase in household income. By contrast, when farmers shift from purchased seeds and fertilizers to sustainable methods that use composting, health improves as families are less exposed to fertilizers spread by hand and runoff in their water supplies. The increases in well-being may not be accounted for in measures of net income. Studies also indicate that the success of poverty alleviation initiatives, and thus well-being, is affected by the degree to which the poor participate in the political and social processes used to develop the Increases in well-being can be either underestimated or overestimated by focusing exclusively on per capita income. 5 ' Allocations of emissions reduction benefits and burdens that use per capita income but do not account for well-being may miss opportunities to account for and stimulate the development of low-GHG initiatives while improving well-being. Allocations that assume that poverty must be alleviated (and developing countries must be given incentives) through increased per capita income thus may induce greater GHG emissions per increase in well-being than allocations that use a broader metric. In short, transformative approaches are more likely to occur if changes in well-being arising from non-monetized labor and consumption are accounted for in climate policy architectures.
We assume that any transformative policy architecture will reflect these core considerations and will stimulate a wide range of more specific private and public governance initiatives. Given the importance of the countries and sectors that will be difficult to include in a more conventional policy architecture, we suggest that scholars and policymakers devote as much time and effort to developing proposed transformative architectures and initiatives as they are now giving to the more conventional approaches.
B. Short-Term Initiatives
To be plausible, any move toward a transformative policy architecture must be able to point to concrete, feasible initiatives. Although we have only sketched the initial outlines of a transformative approach, a number of concrete examples demonstrate that the approach can yield viable initiatives. In Part II.B, we discuss a near-term, private market initiative, and in Part II.C we discuss longer-term initiatives. Our proposed private market initiative involves the addition of equity micro-offsets ("EMOs") as an extension of the growing retail carbon offset market. A few examples of EMOs exist today, and expansion of the private market for EMOs could result in prompt, substantial carbon emission reductions while improving the well-being of the most disadvantaged populations in developed and developing coun-established poverty index. 7 7 In addition, the Millennium Development Goals developed by the United Nations may contribute to the development of useful poverty alleviation measures for EMOs. 75 In addition to serving as the basis for an EMO, establishing a common metric for assessing social justice improvements could benefit not only the carbon markets, but also other institutions that interact with and affect the lives of disadvantaged populations. For example, a common metric also could be applied to the efforts of microfinance institutions as they attempt to improve the lives of households in developing countries. A common metric would enable NGOs that concurrently address GHG emissions and social justice (e.g., The Converging World) to boost the level of transparency to donors. 1 7 9 Overall, the metric could help reduce bias in the comparison of different activities and perhaps serve as a basis for premiums on certain products when established targets are exceeded.
Equity Micro-Offset Projects
We envision equity micro-offsets as a mechanism to reduce carbon emissions in parallel with improving social justice. EMOs are carbon credits generated in the process of improving social equity, with the proceeds of selling the credits helping the project to pay for itself. (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop global partnership for development). For data by series, see MDG Indicators, Data Availability by Series and MDG Region, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data Availability.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The indicators of the poverty goal do not focus on raising overall GDP per capita, but rather on raising the well-being of the least well off.
179 The Converging World is an NGO that uses donations to finance wind turbines. Those turbines are used to generate revenue via the sale of electricity and carbon credits, and the profits are donated to the charity Social Change and Development, which applies the funds toward education, health, and environmental projects in the developing world. The Converging World, About Us, http://www.theconvergingworld.org/document-l .aspxid=0:37374 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"So See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 68-69; Ackerly & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 563. Unfortunately, no economically viable methodology exists that will enable generation of carbon credits based on OECD residential energy improvements; the revenue from these credits is relatively insubstantial (based on a potential annual reduction of up to HeinOnline --33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 341 2009 taken by the Gold Standard and Social Carbon. Current market participants would be encouraged to rate their activities according to accepted methodologies. The incentive for positive ranking may support a premium for their product, and the premium in turn may be used to fund additional projects. Although more research remains to be done, the premium commanded by existing offsets with a social justice component suggests that EMOs may be able to generate a price premium in the carbon credit markets. In addition, the success of organizations such as Global Giving demonstrates that a large market exists for low transaction cost, Internet-driven systems that transfer money from multiple small donors to multiple small-scale projects designed to alleviate poverty in the developing world.' 81 The development of the EMO market could be enhanced by linking it to the growing microfinance movement. Collectively, microfinance institutions have in excess of $25 billion in loans outstanding. 8 2 A recent study of microfinance institutions and their funding sources indicated this money comes from donations (26%), non-commercial borrowing (11%), equity (13%), commercial borrowing (23%), and deposits (27%). institutions make substantial efforts to rate the social performance of their lending, 184 but their measurement schemes do not appear to include GHG emissions impacts. In addition, in the absence of a focus on GHG emissions, microfinance activity can lead to additional carbon emissions. 8 s Integrating even a rough GHG assessment into microfinance lending criteria may not only enhance GHG global emissions reduction efforts, but also increase the pool of potential investors. Given the importance of climate change and climate change mitigation costs to the communities served by microfinance institutions, these institutions may become leading investors in EMOs. Carbon projects that generate credits by mitigating industrial gases have been criticized for contributing little in the way of additional social benefits. 1 8 6 A linkage between carbon projects and social projects may be mutually beneficial.
Recent initiatives demonstrate the feasibility of projects that could generate EMOs. The first involves ongoing efforts to promote improved cook several tons of CO 2 eq per house, and a very modest per-ton value of CO 2 eq, amounting to less than $30/house/year) and must be combined with other funding sources.
'8 See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 14 & n.59.
consumption, or they can be focused on more structural transformations that affect the carbon footprint of an entire community.
98
In the housing sector, energy savings and increases in well-being are possible by scaling up the individual cook stove initiatives discussed above. These ICS projects are examples of household-level micro-initiatives that benefit people in poverty by targeting their largest GHG-emitting and highest cost activities. These initiatives substantially reduce household energy use and carbon emissions while improving well-being in a variety of ways that are not captured by changes in per capita income or similar measures.
The potential impact of the cook stove initiative is an average 39% reduction in CO 2 eq emissions from domestic cooking in developing regions. 99 Around the world, two billion people rely on wood or charcoal for cooking fuel. 2°° Much of the emissions growth that is expected to occur by 2050 will occur in countries with large populations that will otherwise rely on wood or charcoal for cooking. 20 For example, countries most likely to have high demand for improved cook stoves include three of the five biggest current and projected future GHG-emitting countries, India, China, and Brazil.102 ICSs can be made with inexpensive materials.
2 3 They are simple to assemble and easy to use. Similarly, more efficient wood and charcoal stoves have achieved CO 2 eq emissions reductions of almost 4 0% . 20 The most obvious increase in well-being from the switch to efficient cook stoves is savings in time, energy, or money associated with securing adequate fuel. Significant improvements also may occur in health and security. With fuel savings, more people may pasteurize water, which prevents water-borne diseases.
20
Efficient cook stoves also reduce air pollutants and their associated health risks, including chronic lung and heart disease. These negatively affect those who cook (generally women) and those they look after (young children and older people). Efficient cook stoves also reduce weight when women must carry fuel on their heads (headloading). Head-loading causes prolapsed uterus, which causes increases in maternal mortality and stillbirths. 2°6 Finally, women and girls in refugee camps and areas of conflict and violence are physically vulnerable in their search for fuel. Efficient stoves increase well-being by diminishing these exposures as well.
0
Transformational change is also possible in the forestry and agriculture sectors. As we discussed in Part I, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve global per capita emissions of two tons per person without major reductions in emissions from these sectors. Fortunately, recent experimentation in each sector suggests that it is possible for changes in these sectors to contribute substantially to decreases in climate impact and increases in wellbeing.
For example, the Green Belt Movement BioCarbon Project is a large scale reforestation enterprise that consists of small community-based reforestation projects. 2 8 Communities secure a long-term license for the use of all non-wood forest products with the possibility of renewal. Communities ("Forest User Groups") give the Green Belt Movement the CDM rights in exchange for tree planting support, land rents, payments for surviving trees, and a share of the carbon revenues. The Green Belt Movement sells those rights to pay for the activities, and the World Bank finances the enterprise by securitizing the future carbon revenues from the CDM market. 2°9 texts. They exhibit the core characteristics of a new path for climate justice policy discussions.
Of course, many questions remain about such initiatives, including how each might be scaled up or replicated in general and in any particular setting. Our purpose is not to answer these questions, but to reorient the climate change-global justice scholarship and policy dialogue so that more of us are asking these questions and developing policy-relevant proposals.
III. CONCLUSION
Climate change and global justice are difficult to address together, but it is unlikely that either will be resolved if they are treated as separate issues. We should not allow opaque, optimistic assumptions to obscure the choice we are making to forgo even a reasonable aspiration of achieving the widely adopted 2°C target. Instead, we should confront the hard questions that arise when we try to develop policy architectures and initiatives that enable us to achieve that target. When we do so, we will be forced to confront the essential relationship between climate change and global justice, and we will be forced to add a new, transformative set of approaches to the current proposed policy architectures. We have proposed several core characteristics of the new policy architectures, as well as examples of near-term and long-term initiatives.
As we indicated at the outset, it is possible that climate sensitivity will turn out to be less than currently projected, that revolutionary development and adoption of technology will occur, that markets and policy implementation will function perfectly, that per capita incomes will increase without inducing GHG emissions that exceed emissions targets, and that the other optimistic assumptions of proposed policy architectures will turn out to be sound. Many, if not all, of these assumptions need to be sound to substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, however. There is little margin for error, and the accumulation of optimistic assumptions raises serious concerns about the plausibility of the current policy architectures. We suggest that it is only prudent to be transparent about these assumptions so that conscious choices can be made about whether more fundamental -and more difficult -steps are worth taking. If we fail to confront the hard questions, we will not even have the opportunity to make the hard choices.
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